Seven Months of War: U.S.–Iran Conflict, American Power and the Shadow of the 2026

After Iran: Midterm Elections
Diplomacy, military power, economic pressure and the future of America’s position in the Middle East

Araweelo News Network | Associated Online Agencies

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NEW YORK/WASHINGTON — (ANN) — Seven months after the United States and Israel launched major military operations against Iran on February 28, 2026, the conflict has evolved from an initially intense air campaign into a prolonged confrontation involving military pressure, economic sanctions, the Strait of Hormuz and an increasingly complicated diplomatic struggle.
The central question is no longer simply whether the United States can inflict further military damage on Iran. It is whether Washington can convert its considerable military superiority into a sustainable political settlement without imposing unacceptable economic, military and diplomatic costs on itself and its allies.
Recent contacts between American and Iranian representatives during the United Nations General Assembly in New York have revived diplomacy. President Donald Trump described the September 22 meeting as “very good,” while Iranian officials have continued to argue that the conflict can only be resolved through negotiations.
However, an important correction is necessary regarding the timing of a possible agreement. On September 22, Trump publicly said he believed a deal would be reached after the November 3, 2026 midterm elections, rather than before them. In the days that followed, however, he also indicated that negotiations could resume before the election, leaving the timetable uncertain.
The war that did not end quickly
The original American strategy was built around overwhelming military force and the expectation that Iran would quickly lose the ability or willingness to continue the confrontation.
The conflict has not developed according to that timetable.
A September Congressional Research Service assessment described the war as increasingly resembling a war of attrition. It concluded that Iran faces serious economic and military pressures, while the United States, Israel and Gulf partners also face finite military, political and economic capacity.
The United States has achieved major battlefield effects against Iran’s conventional military infrastructure. But the survival of Iran’s government and its continuing ability to launch missiles, drones and asymmetric attacks have complicated Washington’s effort to translate battlefield superiority into a decisive political outcome.
This distinction is important.

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Military superiority is not automatically the same as strategic victory.
The experience of the past seven months demonstrates that the United States can destroy targets deep inside Iran, but controlling the consequences of those attacks is much more difficult.

Iran’s strategy: survive, impose costs and negotiate

From Tehran’s perspective, the conflict has become a test of endurance.
Iran has suffered substantial damage, and its economy has been placed under extraordinary pressure. Its currency has repeatedly fallen to record lows, while inflation, shortages and disruption to energy and trade have increased the domestic cost of the war. The UK House of Commons Library reported that Iranian inflation had reached 84% year-on-year in August and that the IMF projected a contraction of 5.4% for Iran’s economy in 2026 if the conflict continues.
Yet economic pressure has not automatically produced political capitulation.

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Iran’s approach has been to retain enough military capability to impose costs on the United States and its regional partners while preserving bargaining leverage for eventual negotiations.
CSIS analyst Daniel Byman previously described the Iranian strategy as one of enduring the attacks, imposing costs and shifting the centre of gravity of the conflict outward.
That strategy has placed the Gulf at the centre of the confrontation.
Instead of allowing the conflict to remain confined to Iranian territory, Tehran has demonstrated its ability to threaten shipping, energy infrastructure and American military facilities across the Gulf.
The Strait of Hormuz: Iran’s strongest economic lever
The Strait of Hormuz has become one of the most important strategic elements of the war.
The waterway carries a huge proportion of the world’s oil and LNG trade. Its disruption has therefore transformed a regional military conflict into a global economic problem.
Reuters reported on October 2 that September LNG shipments through Hormuz were the highest monthly level since the beginning of the war, but shipping remained exposed to security risks and required complicated measures, including U.S. naval protection.
Energy markets remain vulnerable.
A Reuters survey published September 30 found analysts had raised their 2026 oil-price forecasts, with Brent crude expected to average about $89 per barrel, partly because Gulf exports remain disrupted and a full return to normal Hormuz traffic is not expected immediately.
For Washington, this creates a paradox.
The United States possesses enormous military power, but protecting the global energy system from disruption requires continuing military deployment, naval operations and diplomatic engagement.
Iran does not need to defeat the U.S. Navy in a conventional battle to affect the global economy. It only needs to make commercial shipping sufficiently risky and expensive to create market consequences.
The cost of American military power
The war has also raised questions about the sustainability of U.S. military operations.
The Congressional Research Service reported that the Congressional Budget Office estimated U.S. military operations had cost approximately $38 billion as of August 1, 2026. The same assessment cited a Pentagon evaluation that the expenditure of munitions had produced strategic inventory shortages and exposed weaknesses in the American industrial base for rapidly replacing some weapons.
This does not mean that the United States has lost its military superiority.
Rather, it demonstrates an important limitation of modern warfare: advanced weapons can be extremely effective, but they are also expensive and require industrial capacity to replace them.
The United States can deploy aircraft carriers, long-range aircraft, precision weapons, missile-defense systems and naval forces on a scale Iran cannot match.
But a prolonged war changes the calculation.
The question becomes not simply:
“Can America win another battle?”
It becomes:
“Can America sustain the cost of winning hundreds of battles while protecting its forces, allies and global economic interests?”
That is a substantially different strategic question.
Has the war weakened confidence in American military power?
International experts disagree on what the war ultimately demonstrates about American power.
One interpretation is that the conflict has demonstrated the enormous reach of U.S. military technology. American and Israeli forces were able to penetrate Iranian airspace and strike military, missile, naval and nuclear-related infrastructure on a massive scale.
Another interpretation is that Iran’s continued resistance demonstrates the limits of military power when political objectives are unclear.
The Council on Foreign Relations has noted that the war failed to produce the rapid outcome initially anticipated by the Trump administration and that Iran’s survival has created difficult choices for Washington.
CSIS analyst Vali Nasr has gone further, arguing that Iranian attacks on Gulf bases and energy infrastructure exposed vulnerabilities in the traditional American security architecture. He argues that the conflict has encouraged some Gulf states to reconsider whether U.S. military facilities are purely protective assets or can also become liabilities during a regional war.
These assessments do not establish that American military power has collapsed.
They point instead to a changing definition of power.
The United States remains the dominant external military power in the Gulf, but Iran has demonstrated that missiles, drones, geography, asymmetric warfare and economic disruption can impose costs on a much stronger opponent.

The credibility of American diplomacy
Perhaps the more significant long-term issue is diplomatic credibility.
American allies traditionally expect Washington to provide two things: military protection and predictable diplomacy.

The war has generated questions about both.
In August, The Washington Post reported growing frustration among Gulf officials over what Arab and Western officials described as uncertainty surrounding Washington’s strategy. Analysts cited in the report argued that repeated threats followed by changes in policy had contributed to diminished confidence in American diplomacy.
This is particularly important for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait.

These countries have extensive economic and security relationships with Washington, but they are geographically exposed to Iranian retaliation.
A Gulf government can support an American strategy in principle while simultaneously worrying about what happens when American military facilities on its territory become targets.
CSIS analysts Michael Ratney and Abdullah Alhenaki argued that the war became a test of the U.S.-Saudi security partnership because Riyadh had not sought the conflict and had concerns about the clarity of Washington’s objectives and security assurances.
The consequence could be a greater Gulf emphasis on diversification: maintaining the U.S. security relationship while also developing stronger relations with China, Russia, Iran and other regional powers.

The November 2026 elections
The American midterm elections introduce another layer of complexity.
All 435 seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate will be contested on November 3.
The election does not determine who occupies the White House, because Trump is not on the ballot for another presidential term in 2026. But the outcome can significantly affect Congress’s ability to influence war funding, sanctions, oversight and future military authorization.
The Iran war is therefore becoming part of the domestic political environment surrounding the administration.
Brookings reported earlier in the year that the conflict was unpopular among Americans and was contributing to economic concerns, including higher energy prices and military costs. It also identified divisions inside the Republican coalition over the war.
TIME likewise reported that early polling showed significant public disagreement over the military campaign, with opposition particularly strong among Democrats and more mixed views among Republicans.
For Trump, the political calculation is complicated.
A negotiated settlement before the election could allow the administration to argue that military pressure produced diplomacy.
But a prolonged conflict with high fuel prices, continuing casualties or renewed attacks could create a different political problem.
At the same time, agreeing to major concessions before the election could expose Trump to criticism from political supporters who want Iran subjected to greater pressure.
This creates a narrow diplomatic space.

What does Iran want?
Iran’s recent proposals have centred on ending hostilities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, easing sanctions and unfreezing Iranian assets in exchange for renewed negotiations over its nuclear programme.
Reuters reported that Iranian negotiators proposed a phased arrangement involving the reopening of Hormuz and an easing of the American economic blockade.
Iran subsequently presented a seven-day proposal involving the reopening of the strait and renewed negotiations.
Trump rejected the proposal publicly, arguing that the Iranian conditions were unacceptable. Nevertheless, he later indicated that further discussions could take place.
Iran’s negotiating position therefore appears to rest on three major principles:
Ending the military

campaign;
Restoring economic and maritime access;
Preserving some form of negotiated nuclear framework rather than accepting unrestricted external control over Iran’s nuclear programme.
The United States, meanwhile, has sought stronger restrictions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities, limitations on its military capacity and arrangements that prevent Tehran from again threatening regional shipping and U.S. forces.
The gap between these positions remains substantial.
America’s interests in the Gulf
Despite talk of American energy independence, Washington still has major strategic interests in the Gulf.
Those interests extend beyond oil.
They include:
Protection of international shipping routes;
Security of global energy markets;
Protection of U.S. military personnel and bases;
Countering Iranian missile and drone capabilities;
Preventing nuclear proliferation;
Protecting Israel;
Supporting Gulf partners;
Maintaining freedom of navigation;
Preventing China or another major power from becoming the dominant external security actor in the Gulf.
This is why the United States cannot simply walk away from the region.
Even if America’s direct dependence on Gulf oil has changed, the global economy remains dependent on Gulf energy flows.
A prolonged Hormuz crisis therefore affects American consumers, European economies, Asian industrial powers and global financial markets.
The emerging Gulf dilemma
The Gulf states now face a difficult strategic calculation.
They need American military technology and security partnerships.
But they also need stable relations with Iran because Iran is geographically permanent.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman cannot relocate away from the Gulf.
Washington can deploy forces from thousands of kilometres away.
Iran cannot.
This geographical reality gives Tehran a form of strategic leverage even when its conventional military power is substantially weaker than America’s.
It also explains why Gulf governments increasingly emphasize diplomacy alongside deterrence.
A credibility test for Washington
The greatest long-term consequence of the war may therefore not be measured by the number of Iranian targets destroyed.
It may be measured by what happens after the fighting.
If Washington eventually achieves an agreement that restores maritime security, limits Iran’s nuclear capabilities and provides a durable regional framework, the United States could argue that military pressure successfully produced diplomacy.
If the conflict continues without a settlement, however, questions about the sustainability of American strategy will become more difficult to avoid.
The same applies to diplomacy.
American credibility is not simply the ability to threaten military force.
It is also the ability to make commitments, maintain alliances, negotiate agreements and persuade adversaries that American policy will remain coherent after the immediate crisis has passed.
The road ahead
The latest New York talks offer an opening, but not yet a settlement.
On September 30, Iranian officials said Tehran had received an official U.S. response to its latest proposal, although the details were not disclosed. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Tehran wanted an agreement based on what he described as a “win-win” approach. Meanwhile, mediators including Qatar and Pakistan have continued diplomatic efforts.
At the same time, the United States is increasing military pressure. On October 2, Al Jazeera reported that Washington was preparing to send a third aircraft carrier toward the region as part of a wider military deployment.
That combination—military escalation alongside diplomatic negotiations—may define the next phase.
The United States wants leverage at the negotiating table.
Iran wants to demonstrate that continued pressure will not force unconditional surrender.
The Gulf states want the war to end without abandoning their security relationships with Washington.
And the global economy wants the Strait of Hormuz to remain open.
Conclusion
Seven months into the conflict, the central lesson is that American military superiority has not eliminated the political complexity of the Middle East.
Iran has been heavily damaged but has remained capable of imposing costs.
The United States has demonstrated extraordinary military reach but has also discovered the economic and logistical costs of prolonged high-intensity warfare.
The Gulf states continue to depend on Washington while simultaneously seeking greater protection from becoming the battlefield between Washington and Tehran.
And the November elections have added domestic political pressure to an already complicated diplomatic calculation.
The New York talks therefore represent more than another attempt at a ceasefire.
They are a test of whether military power can eventually be transformed into diplomacy—and whether American influence in the Gulf can survive a war that has exposed both the extraordinary strength and the practical limitations of U.S. power.
Araweelo News Network | Associated Online Agencies
This analysis distinguishes reported facts from the interpretations of identified experts. The situation remains fluid, and claims by the governments of the United States and Iran about military effectiveness, negotiations and strategic objectives should be treated as competing official positions unless independently verified.
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