A New Dawn for Somalia — or Another Syria in the Making?

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Araweelo News Network | Associated Online Agencies.

Estimated reading time: 10–12 minutes
“Daayeer xaraar ka lushaa, qonof uu cuskado buu og yahay.”
A monkey hanging from a dangerous branch knows which supporting branch it can hold on to.

Author: Abdillahi Jama Ali – Qurus

There are Somali proverbs that become more meaningful with time. This is one of them.
Today, the qonof—the supporting branch—appears to be Turkey.
Reports that Somalia has formally requested Turkey to take over broader responsibility for the country’s security therefore deserve much more attention than a routine diplomatic development. If the reported request is confirmed, it would mark another significant step in the transformation of Somalia’s security architecture—from an African-led international mission toward an increasingly bilateral relationship with a powerful external partner.
The question is not whether Turkey can help Somalia.
It can.
The more important question is: what happens when a fragile state begins to rely so heavily on one external power that the external power becomes the strategic cushion behind its political and security decisions?
Is Turkey helping Somalia reach a new dawn—or is Somalia creating the conditions for another Syria?
Turkey: From Partner to Strategic Pillar
Turkey’s role in Somalia is no longer limited to humanitarian assistance, schools, hospitals or military training.
The relationship has developed into a broad strategic partnership.
In February 2024, Somalia and Turkey signed a Defence and Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Turkey subsequently committed to supporting Somalia’s maritime security and helping build, train and equip the Somali Navy.
Turkey’s involvement has also extended into the maritime and energy sectors. Ankara has been preparing to explore oil and gas resources off Somalia’s coast, while Turkish naval forces have been authorized to operate in Somali waters.
Turkey’s military presence has now been extended further, with the Turkish parliament approving another two-year mandate in 2026, keeping Turkish forces in Somalia until 2028.
This is no longer an ordinary bilateral security partnership.
It is becoming a strategic architecture. And that is precisely why the reported Somali request is so important.
The Qonof
The Somali proverb does not describe a monkey that has fallen. It describes a monkey that deliberately hangs from a dangerous branch because it knows there is another branch on which it can rely.
That is a remarkably accurate metaphor for the politics of weak states. A government may take increasingly risky decisions when it knows that a powerful external patron is standing behind it.
The patron becomes the qonof.
The question is whether Somalia’s growing dependence on Turkey could produce such a relationship.
If the Somali government believes that Turkey will provide the military capability, diplomatic protection, maritime security and strategic backing it needs, the psychological effect can be enormous.
The government may become more confident. But confidence can become overconfidence.
And overconfidence can become recklessness.
From AUSSOM to Ankara
This development must also be viewed against the background of AUSSOM.
The African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia became operational on 1 January 2025 as the successor to ATMIS. Its mandate is built around supporting Somalia’s security transition and the eventual assumption of greater responsibility by Somali forces.
Yet AUSSOM has faced the familiar problem that has accompanied Somalia’s international security missions for decades:
Who pays for Somalia’s security?
And behind that question lies another:
Who ultimately controls the security strategy?
If African countries provide the troops, international partners provide the money, and Turkey increasingly provides strategic military capability, Somalia risks becoming a state whose security architecture is assembled by outsiders.
The uniforms may be Somali.
The flag may be Somali.
But the strategic architecture may belong elsewhere.
That is not sovereignty in its fullest sense.
The Syrian Warning
Somalia is not Syria. The two countries have different histories, societies, geography and political circumstances. Any direct comparison would therefore be misleading.
But Syria offers an important warning about a broader phenomenon:
When domestic political conflicts become intertwined with competing external powers, internal disputes can become internationalized.
What begins as a domestic struggle can gradually acquire regional and international dimensions.
External powers then support different interests, different factions and different strategic objectives.
The country becomes an arena. Somalia must avoid that fate. Its greatest danger is not Turkey itself. Nor is it any other foreign country.
The danger is dependency without institutional safeguards.
• A foreign partner can help build a national army.
But it must not become the substitute for a national security institution.
• A foreign navy can protect territorial waters.
But it must not become the permanent guardian of national sovereignty.
• A foreign government can train soldiers.
But it should not become the ultimate arbiter of Somalia’s internal political disputes.
Turkey Has Interests Too
There is another reality that Somalia cannot ignore. Turkey is not operating in Somalia purely out of charity. Turkey has legitimate national interests.
• It wants strategic influence in the Horn of Africa.
• It has commercial interests.
• It has maritime interests.
• It has energy interests
• It has a growing African foreign-policy agenda.
The Turkish-Somali agreements combine security, maritime affairs and economic cooperation. Turkey’s planned energy activities off Somalia’s coast demonstrate how closely these interests can overlap.
There is nothing inherently wrong with this. States pursue national interests.
The problem arises when the interests of the external power and the interests of the weaker state become so intertwined that the weaker state loses the ability to distinguish between partnership and dependence.
That is where sovereignty begins to become complicated.
A New Dawn Is Still Possible
None of this means that Somalia should reject Turkey.
On the contrary, Turkey could play an extremely constructive role.
A strong Turkish partnership could help Somalia build:
• a professional national army;
• an effective navy and coast guard;
• functioning intelligence institutions;
• modern military infrastructure;
• maritime surveillance capabilities;
• counterterrorism capacity;
• and eventually a security system capable of standing on its own.
That would indeed constitute a new dawn.
But there is one condition:
Turkey must help Somalia build the capacity to stand without Turkey. That should be the ultimate measure of the partnership. If Turkish assistance produces stronger Somali institutions, it is partnership. If it produces permanent Somali dependence, it is something else.
The Real Test
The real test is therefore not how many Turkish soldiers are in Somalia.
It is not how many Turkish drones Somalia possesses.
It is not how many agreements are signed.
The real test is much simpler:
Can Somalia eventually protect itself without asking another country to protect it?
If the answer is yes, Turkey’s involvement may become one of the most important building blocks in Somalia’s recovery.
If the answer is no, then Somalia may simply have exchanged one form of external dependence for another.
AUSSOM may decline.
Another arrangement may emerge.
One foreign partner may leave.
Another may arrive.
But the underlying problem will remain.

The Dangerous Branch
Somalia has spent decades looking outward for security.
Ethiopia.Eritrea. Uganda. Kenya. The United States. The European Union. The African Union. Turkey. Egypt. Qatar.
The list continues to grow.
The tragedy is that Somalia’s security problem has never been simply a shortage of foreign partners.
It has been the absence of a sufficiently strong, legitimate and nationally accepted security architecture of its own.
That is why the Somali proverb is so relevant today.
“Daayeer xaraar ka lushaa, qonof uu cuskado buu og yahay.”
The monkey knows the supporting branch. But the existence of a supporting branch does not make the dangerous branch safe.
Turkey may indeed be the qonof that Somalia believes it can rely upon. But a nation cannot hang indefinitely from branches belonging to other countries.
Eventually, it must build its own tree.
A New Dawn — or Another Syria?
Somalia stands at an important crossroads.
One path leads toward a genuine strategic partnership with Turkey: stronger institutions, stronger national forces, protected territorial waters, economic development and eventually greater sovereignty.
The other path is more dangerous: increasing external dependence, political risk-taking, competing foreign interests and the gradual internationalization of Somalia’s internal conflicts.
The choice should not be Turkey or no Turkey.
The choice should be:
Turkey as a partner—or Turkey as a permanent security guarantor?
There is a profound difference.
• A partner helps you stand.
• A guarantor allows you to keep leaning.
And a country that becomes accustomed to leaning may eventually forget how to stand.
That is the warning hidden inside the old Somali proverb.
The monkey may know the branch on which it can lean.
But Somalia must ultimately learn to stand on its own feet.

 

  1. By Abdillahi Jama Ali – Qurus .A former teacher, trainer, radio journalist, manager, Member of Parliament and Minister, He is now a writer, contributor  and political analyst, drawing on more than 50 years of professional, public-service and political experience. Abdullahi Jama Ali is also a contributor to Araweelo News Network / Associated Online Agencies, where he has published numerous articles and political analyses. His work focuses particularly on current affairs, governance, policy developments, and geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, offering readers well-crafted perspectives shaped by decades of professional, public-service, and political experience.