Araweelo News Network [ Associated Online Agencies

By: Khadar Suldan Aadan Faarax

Introduction

In an era defined by contested maritime chokepoints, resurgent great power competition, and volatile regional alliances, strategic foresight in foreign policy has become indispensable. For Greece, a nation with an enduring maritime legacy and one of the world’s largest merchant fleets, stability in sea lanes such as Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden directly impacts national security and economic resilience. Yet despite its global maritime interests, Athens has remained disengaged from one of the most stable and geopolitically valuable actors in the Horn of Africa: Somaliland.

Somaliland’s story is not merely that of a breakaway region; it is that of a sovereign state with a distinct colonial and postcolonial history. Formerly known as British Somaliland, it gained full independence from the United Kingdom on June 26, 1960, and become the State of Somaliland. During its brief period of sovereignty, Somaliland was recognized by over 35 countries, including five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and Israel. (Government of Somaliland, 2023).

However, just five days later, on July 1, 1960, Somaliland voluntarily united with the former Italian-administered Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Somali Republic. This union did not follow the legal formalities necessary for a binding international agreement, such as the ratification of acts of union by both parties. The political and legal foundations of this union were weak from the outset, lacking a signed constitutional framework or popular ratification (Fitzpatrick, 2019). As Somalia descended into state failure and civil war in the late 1980s, Somaliland withdrew from the Somali Union. It reclaimed its independence on May 18, 1991, reestablishing its government, borders, and institutions as they had existed at the time of independence in 1960 (Lewis, 2008).

Today, Somaliland operates as a self-governing democratic state with regular elections, a professional security sector, and control over an important 850-kilometer coastline along one of the world’s most vital maritime corridors. Somaliland has become a significant regional player in the maritime security of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden (International Crisis Group, 2022).

Recognizing and establishing genuine relations with Somaliland is not a diplomatic risk but a strategic necessity for Greece, economically, geopolitically, and culturally. It asserts that such engagement is in line with international legal norms, reflects the increasing global interest in diverse regional partnerships, and builds upon a millennia-old connection between ancient Greece and the Somaliland coast, historically known as Barbaria (Harris, 2020; Herodotus, c. 450 BCE).

Historical ties: From Barbaria to Berbera

The relationship between Greece and the Horn of Africa is neither recent nor artificial in nature. Classical sources, such as the Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, a 1st-century CE Greco-Roman maritime guide, highlight the Somaliland coast, known then as Barbaria, as a major trading hub. Ports such as Malao (modern-day Berbera) and Mundus (Maydh) were known for exporting frankincense, myrrh, ivory, and spices to Egypt, the Levant, and Mediterranean markets (Casson, 1989).

The Greeks referred to the local inhabitants as Barbaroi, not in a pejorative sense, but as a term used for those outside the Hellenic cultural sphere. This early trade-based interaction laid the foundation for civilizational familiarity between the Greek world and what is now Somaliland. Reviving this ancient connection could provide a compelling soft-power narrative for renewed engagement in the 21st century and beyond.

Geostrategic logic: Somaliland’s maritime position

Somaliland holds a strategic maritime position at the intersection of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Nearly 10% of global maritime trade, including vital energy shipments from the Gulf to Europe and Asia, passes through these waters (UNCTAD, 2023). The port of Berbera, which is currently undergoing significant expansion through foreign direct investment from the UAE’s DP World, is quickly becoming a viable alternative to the regions congested and unsafe ports (Aljazeera, 2024).

For Greece, a maritime nation that is heavily reliant on the free flow of commerce through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, this situation represents a valuable strategic interest (Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).

Strategic benefits for Greece

Maritime influence extension: Partnering strategically with Somaliland would help Greece expand its maritime diplomacy from the Eastern Mediterranean to Red Sea and Indo-Pacific regions. By forming a close relationship with Somaliland, Greece can extend its influence beyond the familiar waters of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Red Sea is a critical maritime corridor connecting Europe to Indo-Pacific. From the port of Berbera, Greek naval ships and merchant vessels gained a strategic and reliable base along the Suez–Bab el-Mandeb route (Bergenas & Kelly, 2023).

Counterbalance to rival powers: Across East Africa, ports funded by China and Turkish military bases are reduce Western influence. For instance, China’s investment in Djibouti’s Doraleh Container Terminal has enabled Beijing to establish a military foothold in the region, whereas Turkey’s construction of a large base in Mogadishu has prioritized Ankara’s strategic interests (Smith, 2021; Jones, 2022). A partnership between Greece and Somaliland offers a timely alternative based on democratic principles and transparent investment. While Turkey’s large military presence in Mogadishu and China’s involvement in Djibouti focus on their own strategic goals (Smith, 2021; World Bank, 2020), Greece can present itself as a modest but principled partner supporting anti-corruption measures, port management standards, and inclusive development projects, by providing training for Somaliland’s coast guard and offering scholarships at Greek naval academies.

Energy Security: Greek merchant ships sailed the Red Sea during Ptolemaic times, transporting wine and olive oil in clay jars to the Horn of Africa, as documented in historical and archaeological records (Cartwright, 2018). Archaeological evidence, such as ancient coins discovered in Zeila and Berbera, confirms that pre-Islamic trade routes existed in the region (Freund & Kus, 2009). Reviving these narratives allows Greece to emphasize its historical maritime legacy and distinguish itself from newer geopolitical actors such as China. Initiatives such as joint Greek-Somaliland archaeological expeditions, explorations of submerged ancient ports (Hatzopoulos, 2016), and traveling museum exhibits could bridge Somaliland’s heritage with Greece’s maritime past. Educational partnerships, including summer schools in Rhodes that teach Aegean navigation to Somaliland students, foster cross-generational understanding. By weaving ancient narratives into modern diplomacy, Greece offers Somaliland a partnership rooted in mutual respect rather than transient economic interests.

Conclusion

The question facing Greece is to Recognize Somaliland and become an active participant in shaping the emerging order in the Horn of Africa or remain a passive observer of one of the world’s most vital maritime arteries.

Recognizing and Engaging with Somaliland  is not a diplomatic gamble; it is a well-calculated strategic realignment that honors historical ties, meets contemporary security needs, and positions Greece as a forward-looking maritime power.

@ Khadar Suldan Aadan Faarax is a Security and Governance analyst with peer-reviewed publications on the Horn of Africa and Maritime Geopolitics.