SAUDI ARABIA’S POWER PARADOX

Rich, Armed—and Still Struggling to Command Its Strategic Neighbourhood

Araweelo News Network | Associated Online Agencies

By Abdillahi Jama Ali – Qurus

Reading Time
10–12 minutes

Saudi Arabia is accustomed to being treated as a regional heavyweight. It has enormous financial resources, advanced weapons, a powerful air force, substantial military capabilities and considerable diplomatic reach. It possesses vast energy reserves and sits at the centre of one of the world’s most strategically important regions. It also holds a unique position in the Muslim world as custodian of Mecca and Medina.
By almost every conventional measure, Saudi Arabia is a great regional power. Yet a more uncomfortable question deserves to be asked:
How much of that power can Riyadh actually convert into strategic influence over the neighbourhood immediately surrounding it?
The answer is far less impressive.
Yemen remains unresolved.
Iran remains a formidable strategic rival.
The Strait of Hormuz remains vulnerable to Iranian pressure.
And the Bab el-Mandeb—the southern gateway to the Red Sea—has demonstrated that even Saudi-linked shipping can be deterred by a much smaller actor operating from Yemen.
This is not a question of whether Saudi Arabia is powerful. It clearly is.
The question is whether Saudi Arabia has learned how to turn power into leverage.
And that is where the paradox begins.

Yemen: The Most Revealing Test
If there is one country that should have fallen naturally within Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence, it is Yemen.
Yemen is Saudi Arabia’s immediate southern neighbour. Its people are Arab. Its history, society, tribal structures and economy have long been intertwined with the Kingdom.
For decades, Riyadh cultivated political, tribal and economic relationships inside Yemen. Saudi Arabia supported governments and political forces there and eventually intervened militarily on a massive scale.
Yet after years of intervention, Yemen did not emerge as a stable political order reliably aligned with Saudi strategic interests. Instead, the Houthis became a formidable independent force.
That is the first great lesson.
Money, military power and proximity did not produce strategic control.
And the latest developments make the point even more starkly.
In July 2026, the Houthis announced a blockade targeting shipping connected to Saudi ports. Several vessels turned around after warnings, including two tankers carrying Saudi crude from Yanbu. The two vessels reportedly carried a combined 2.8 million barrels of oil.
The significance is larger than the individual ships.
Saudi Arabia possesses vastly greater military and financial resources than the Houthis.
Yet a relatively small movement operating from Yemen was able to alter the calculations of shipowners, insurers and energy companies—and impose costs on one of the world’s largest oil exporters.
That is not conventional military defeat. But it is a powerful demonstration of the limits of conventional power.

The Bab el-Mandeb Test
The geography makes the paradox even more striking.
Saudi Arabia’s western coastline opens onto the Red Sea. Its oil infrastructure at Yanbu provides an alternative route for exporting energy when the Persian Gulf becomes insecure. But the Red Sea has a southern gate:
Bab el-Mandeb. And that gate lies beside Yemen.
The narrow strait separates Yemen from the Horn of Africa and forms the maritime connection between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. In 2024, around 4.1 billion barrels of crude oil and refined petroleum products passed through it—roughly five percent of global petroleum flows.
The strategic irony is difficult to miss.
Saudi Arabia has the resources to build one of the world’s most sophisticated military establishments.
But it cannot simply guarantee the security of the maritime corridor upon which its Red Sea strategy depends.
The Houthis do not need to occupy Bab el-Mandeb.
They do not need a conventional navy comparable to Saudi Arabia’s.
They only need to create enough risk to change the calculations of commercial shipping. That is asymmetric power. And it is precisely what has happened.

Two Chokepoints, One Kingdom
Now look east.
Across the Arabian Peninsula lies Iran. The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Saudi Arabia may possess greater financial resources and extensive military relationships with Western powers, but it cannot dictate Iranian behaviour.
The contrast is remarkable.
At one end of the Arabian Peninsula, Iran can threaten Hormuz.
At the other, the Houthis can threaten Bab el-Mandeb.
And Saudi Arabia sits between the two.
Recent events have made this geography even more consequential. The crisis around Hormuz has pushed Gulf states to accelerate alternative export routes and strengthen Red Sea infrastructure, precisely because dependence on a single maritime chokepoint carries enormous strategic risk.
Saudi Arabia therefore faces a strategic dilemma:
Its eastern maritime gateway is exposed to Iranian pressure, while its western alternative depends upon a southern gateway vulnerable to Houthi pressure.
That is an extraordinary position for a country of Saudi Arabia’s wealth and military power.

Wealth Is Not Leadership
For decades, Saudi Arabia has possessed one of the most powerful instruments of influence available to any state: money. It has funded governments, supported political movements, financed development projects, provided assistance and cultivated relationships throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds.
But money has a limitation.
Money can buy access without producing obedience.
It can buy goodwill without creating loyalty.
It can create dependency without creating strategic alignment.
And it can make a country popular without making it powerful in the most important sense of the word.
This distinction matters.
A country may be surrounded by governments that welcome its financial assistance while quietly pursuing their own national interests.
That is not necessarily influence.
It is often simply transactional diplomacy.

The “Sugar Daddy” Problem
This is where the provocative description of Saudi Arabia as the region’s “sugar daddy” becomes revealing.
Many Arab governments understand perfectly well where the money is.
They know how valuable Saudi financial support can be.
They cultivate the relationship. They smile. They maintain close ties. But they also understand their own national interests.
They do not necessarily follow Riyadh because Riyadh has commanded them to do so.
The distinction is uncomfortable:
Saudi Arabia can buy friends. But can it produce followers?
That is a very different question.
And it goes to the heart of the Kingdom’s power paradox.
The UAE Offers a Different Model
The United Arab Emirates provides an instructive contrast. The UAE is dramatically smaller than Saudi Arabia in population and territorial scale. Yet Abu Dhabi and Dubai have developed a very different conception of how money can be converted into strategic influence.
They have invested in:
ports, logistics, infrastructure, commercial networks and strategic geographical positions.
Berbera is one of the clearest examples. DP World, a Dubai-based company, developed the port in Somaliland through a major investment programme. The first phase of the modern terminal increased capacity substantially, and DP World has continued to develop the port and the surrounding economic zone.
The significance is not merely the amount of money invested. It is what the money purchased. A port. A logistics platform. A commercial corridor. A connection to Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa. And a strategic position overlooking the Gulf of Aden.
DP World has also established a shipping connection between Jebel Ali and Berbera, reinforcing the port’s role as a Gulf–Horn logistics gateway.
This is the difference between wealth and strategic investment. The UAE did not merely put money into the region. It converted money into assets, access and geography.
The UAE Turned Money Into Geography
That may be the most revealing comparison.
Saudi Arabia had the money.
Saudi Arabia had the religious standing.
Saudi Arabia had the proximity.
Saudi Arabia had enormous interests in the Red Sea.
But the UAE moved more aggressively to establish a tangible strategic presence around one of the most important maritime positions on the southern approaches to the Red Sea.
The UAE turned money into geography.
Saudi Arabia too often turned money into patronage.
That distinction deserves serious attention in Riyadh.
Because strategic power is not simply about possessing resources. It is about positioning those resources where they can change the behaviour of others.

Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea Blind Spot
Saudi Arabia has never ignored the Red Sea.vThat would be unfair. It has major interests along its own western coastline and has invested heavily in Red Sea ports and infrastructure.vBut there is a difference between developing one’s own coastline and developing strategic depth beyond it. The Red Sea does not begin at Jeddah.
Its security begins much farther south. It reaches toward Bab el-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.
That means Saudi strategic thinking cannot stop at its own territorial waters.vThe southern approaches matter The geography of Yemen matters. The Horn of Africa matters. Berbera matters. Djibouti matters.bEritrea matters. And the Gulf of Aden matters.
Yet other powers—including the UAE—have moved aggressively to establish commercial and strategic positions in precisely these spaces.
Saudi Arabia has sometimes appeared more comfortable investing heavily at home than building equivalent strategic depth abroad.
That may prove costly.vGeography Is Power Look at the map.
The maritime system surrounding Saudi Arabia links:
Persian Gulf → Strait of Hormuz → Arabian Sea → Gulf of Aden → Bab el-Mandeb → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Mediterranean.
This is one interconnected strategic system. A disruption at one point affects the others. A threat to Hormuz increases the importance of the Red Sea.
A threat to Bab el-Mandeb increases the importance of alternative Gulf routes.vA crisis in Yemen affects Saudi Arabia. A crisis in the Horn affects the Red Sea.
And developments around the Horn can ultimately affect the security and economic calculations of the Arabian Peninsula.
This is why geography cannot be treated as background.
Geography is power.
The state that understands geography can sometimes achieve more with a port, a corridor or a partnership than another state can achieve with billions of dollars spent on weapons.

Religious Leadership Is Not Geopolitical Leadership
Saudi Arabia possesses something no other Arab state can replicate. Mecca and Medina.
Its custodianship of Islam’s two holiest cities gives the Kingdom extraordinary religious prestige.
That influence should never be underestimated. But religious leadership and geopolitical leadership are not the same thing. Respect does not automatically produce political obedience.
Religious authority does not automatically translate into strategic alignment.
A government may deeply respect Saudi Arabia while simultaneously pursuing policies that Riyadh dislikes.
This distinction is becoming increasingly important in a Middle East where states are diversifying their alliances and pursuing increasingly independent foreign policies.

The Real Measure of Power
So what is power?
Is it the size of the defence budget?
The number of fighter aircraft?
The size of sovereign wealth?
The ability to finance other governments?
The possession of advanced weapons?
Or is power ultimately the ability to shape the behaviour of other actors?
If the last definition is the most meaningful, Saudi Arabia’s record becomes considerably more complicated.
A country can be extraordinarily rich and still struggle to influence its neighbour.
It can possess sophisticated weapons and still struggle to secure a maritime corridor.
It can possess immense religious prestige and still fail to command political loyalty.
And it can spend billions defending itself while smaller actors exploit geography to impose costs upon it.
That is the paradox.
Saudi Arabia Is Not Weak
None of this means Saudi Arabia is weak.
It is not.
Saudi Arabia remains one of the most important states in the Middle East. Its economic weight, energy resources, military capabilities, diplomatic reach and religious importance make it impossible to ignore.
The argument is different.
Saudi Arabia possesses enormous power.
But possession of power and effective use of power are not the same thing.
The question is whether Riyadh has converted enough of its resources into lasting strategic leverage.
Yemen suggests a serious limitation.
Iran presents another.
Bab el-Mandeb exposes another.
And the changing strategic landscape of the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa demonstrates that smaller actors can sometimes exploit geography more effectively than much larger states.

The Saudi Lesson
The lesson for Riyadh is not that it needs more money.
It has money. It does not necessarily need more weapons. It already possesses formidable military capabilities. What it needs is strategic conversion.
Money must become infrastructure.
Infrastructure must become access.
Access must become partnerships.
Partnerships must become strategic depth.
And strategic depth must become influence.
That is how wealth becomes power.
Otherwise, wealth remains wealth.

The Real Paradox
Saudi Arabia possesses extraordinary advantages:
Extraordinary wealth.
Extraordinary military resources.
Extraordinary religious standing.
Extraordinary geography.
Yet its ability to command the strategic environment immediately surrounding it remains surprisingly limited.
Iran can threaten the eastern maritime gateway.
The Houthis can disrupt the southern maritime gateway.
Yemen remains unresolved.
And across the Gulf of Aden, other powers have established strategic positions that Riyadh could have exploited more decisively.
The paradox is therefore not that Saudi Arabia is weak.
It is that Saudi Arabia is powerful without always being strategically decisive.
And that distinction matters.
Because in the new Middle East, power will increasingly belong not to the state that possesses the most resources, but to the state that knows where to place them, how to connect them and how to turn geography into leverage.
The UAE appears to have understood part of that equation.
Iran has understood another part.
The Houthis, despite their vastly smaller resources, have demonstrated yet another.
The question now is whether Saudi Arabia will adapt.
Because the future of the Kingdom’s power will not be determined simply by how much it possesses.
It will be determined by what it can make its power accomplish.
And that is the real Saudi power paradox.

By Abdillahi Jama Ali – Qurus .A former teacher, trainer, radio journalist, manager, Member of Parliament and Minister, He is now a writer, contributor  and political analyst, drawing on more than 50 years of professional, public-service and political experience. Abdullahi Jama Ali is also a contributor to Araweelo News Network / Associated Online Agencies, where he has published numerous articles and political analyses. His work focuses particularly on current affairs, governance, policy developments, and geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, offering readers well-crafted perspectives shaped by decades of professional, public-service, and political experience.