The Assab Question: A hard nut to crack

Ethiopia, America and the Emerging Struggle for the Bab el-Mandeb

Araweelo News Network | Associated Online Agencies

Author: Abdillahi Jama Ali – Qurus

Reading time: 12–15 minutes

The Horn of Africa may be entering a new strategic chapter.
In late July 2026, Addis Ababa hosted the African Logistics and Communications Symposium, co-hosted by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Ethiopian National Defense Force. The gathering brought together more than 200 senior military, logistics and communications officials, defence-industry representatives and participants from nearly 40 African countries. Its focus was logistics, communications, military readiness, innovation and security cooperation.
The meeting was significant not simply because of its size, but because of where it took place and what is happening around the Red Sea.
AFRICOM Commander General Dagvin Anderson was in Ethiopia from July 26 and met Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and senior Ethiopian military officials. He subsequently travelled to Kenya and Somalia, meeting political and military leaders.
At the same time, Ethiopia is becoming increasingly vocal about its need for access to the sea, while tensions with Eritrea are rising.
This raises a larger question:
Is Washington developing a new strategic relationship with Ethiopia as part of a broader effort to secure the Horn of Africa and the Bab el-Mandeb?
There is no evidence that the United States is preparing Ethiopia to seize Eritrean territory. Such a claim would go beyond the available evidence.
But there is a strategic possibility that deserves serious examination:
What happens if Ethiopia’s growing military capacity, its determination to obtain Red Sea access and America’s interest in securing the Bab el-Mandeb begin to converge?
That is where the Assab question becomes important.

The Bab el-Mandeb: Why Washington Cares
The Bab el-Mandeb is the narrow maritime gateway between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Through this passage runs one of the world’s most important shipping routes, connecting the Indian Ocean with the Suez Canal and, ultimately, European and Asian markets.
Its strategic importance has become much more immediate because of the Houthi attacks on commercial shipping from Yemen.
The attacks demonstrated that the security of the Bab el-Mandeb can be challenged from the Arabian side by a non-state actor with relatively limited resources. Ships have been attacked, shipping routes disrupted and vessels diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, adding substantial time and cost to global trade.
For Washington, this is precisely the problem.
The Bab el-Mandeb is no longer merely a strategic chokepoint on a map. It is an active security theatre.
The United States therefore has a direct interest in maintaining freedom of navigation and preventing any hostile actor from acquiring the ability to dominate or repeatedly disrupt the waterway.
That makes the African side of the Bab el-Mandeb increasingly important. And it puts the Horn of Africa at the centre of the calculation.

Ethiopia Wants the Sea
Ethiopia is one of Africa’s largest and most powerful states, but it has been landlocked since Eritrea became independent in 1993. For Addis Ababa, dependence on foreign ports is increasingly regarded as a strategic vulnerability. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly argued that Ethiopia must obtain reliable access to the sea. In March, he insisted that Ethiopia had no intention of invading its neighbours and said the issue should be resolved peacefully through negotiation.
But the Ethiopian debate is becoming more assertive.
Ethiopian commentary has increasingly presented maritime access as a matter of national strategy, while Assab has returned to public discussion as a historically important Ethiopian port. The message is becoming unmistakable: Ethiopia intends to overcome its permanent dependence on being landlocked.
The question is how.
Why Assab Matters
Assab is not simply another port. It lies on Eritrea’s southern Red Sea coast, relatively close to the Bab el-Mandeb and geographically close to Ethiopia’s Afar region.
For Ethiopia, access to Assab would provide a direct Red Sea outlet.
For Eritrea, Assab is sovereign territory. That is the central tension.
In February 2026, Ethiopia raised the possibility of negotiating access through Assab, while relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara were simultaneously deteriorating. Ethiopia accused Eritrea of military aggression and support for armed groups, while Eritrea remained deeply suspicious of Ethiopia’s intentions toward its Red Sea coastline.
The issue is therefore no longer theoretical. Assab has become part of the strategic contest between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The American Connection
This is where the recent U.S.–Ethiopian engagement becomes important.
The Addis Ababa symposium was centred on logistics, communications and military readiness. These are not secondary elements of modern military power. They determine how forces move, communicate, receive supplies and sustain operations.
AFRICOM’s decision to hold the event jointly with the Ethiopian military—and the subsequent high-level meetings between American and Ethiopian officials—demonstrate the depth of the security relationship.
This does not prove that Washington has chosen Ethiopia as a future Red Sea military power. But it raises a legitimate strategic question.
If the United States wants a stronger security architecture around the Bab el-Mandeb, could Ethiopia become one of its principal regional military partners?
If so, Ethiopia’s growing military capacity would have implications beyond its existing counterterrorism role.

The Assab Scenario
Consider the possible trajectory.
• The United States strengthens Ethiopia through military cooperation, logistics, communications, training, intelligence and defence relationships.
• Ethiopia becomes more capable of projecting power.
• At the same time, Addis Ababa continues to regard maritime access as a strategic necessity.
• Negotiations with Eritrea succeed—or fail.
• If they succeed, Ethiopia could obtain commercial access to the Red Sea.
• If they fail, the situation becomes much more dangerous.

The question then becomes:
Would Washington insist that Ethiopia accept the existing territorial order, or could it eventually regard Ethiopian access to the Red Sea as compatible with its own strategic interests?
There is currently no evidence that the United States supports an Ethiopian military seizure of Assab. But that is not the only question worth asking.
The more important question is whether a stronger Ethiopia could eventually become part of the American security architecture around the Bab el-Mandeb.
That possibility deserves scrutiny.

Eritrea Has Every Reason to Be Concerned
From Asmara’s perspective, the issue is straightforward.
Assab is Eritrean.
Any Ethiopian attempt to acquire it by force would threaten Eritrea’s territorial integrity and fundamentally alter the balance of power on the Red Sea.
Eritrea has therefore strong reasons to watch the development of the U.S.–Ethiopian military relationship.
If Addis Ababa is demanding sea access while simultaneously becoming a stronger military partner of Washington, Asmara will inevitably ask whether these developments are connected.
That concern is reinforced by Eritrea’s growing relationship with Egypt.
In June, Egypt and Eritrea agreed to strengthen cooperation in several areas, including the maritime economy. Egypt has also shown interest in Eritrean ports, including Assab and Massawa.
The regional picture is changing.

Egypt’s Red Line
Egypt’s position is even more consequential.
Cairo’s strategic interests stretch from the Nile to the Suez Canal and down into the Red Sea.
Its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has already created a serious strategic rivalry.
An Ethiopian military foothold on the Red Sea would add another dimension.
Egypt has indicated that it could support commercial Ethiopian access to the sea, but it is much more wary of a permanent Ethiopian military presence on the Red Sea.
In July, Egypt and Eritrea went further, emphasizing that the security and governance of the Red Sea belong to the littoral states and rejecting attempts by non-littoral states to impose arrangements that undermine regional stability. The message is significant. Ethiopia is a non-littoral state.
Egypt and Eritrea are effectively asserting that the Red Sea security order should remain primarily in the hands of the countries that border it.
That position directly intersects with Ethiopia’s ambitions.

Somalia, Somaliland and the Gulf of Aden
The wider strategic picture also includes Somalia and Somaliland.
Somalia remains an important U.S. security partner. During General Anderson’s July visit to Mogadishu, he met President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and senior Somali defence officials to discuss security cooperation and support for Somalia’s security forces.
Somaliland occupies a different position in the maritime geography. Its coastline faces the Gulf of Aden, and Berbera is strategically positioned along the maritime corridor leading toward the Bab el-Mandeb.
This gives Berbera importance independent of the wider political dispute.
For Ethiopia, this creates another possibility.
Instead of seeking a military foothold on Eritrea’s Red Sea coast, Ethiopia could pursue expanded commercial and logistical access through Berbera.
The two options are strategically different.
Assab places Ethiopia directly on the Red Sea.
Berbera gives Ethiopia access to the Gulf of Aden.
Both are connected to the same maritime system.
But the political consequences are very different.

The Houthi Threat Changes the Calculation
This is where the Houthi factor becomes particularly important.
The attacks from Yemen have demonstrated that control of the maritime environment cannot be understood simply in terms of conventional borders.
A threat emerging from Yemen can affect shipping thousands of kilometres away.
That makes the African coastline opposite Yemen strategically valuable.
Eritrea, Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia all occupy positions within this maritime security environment.
Ethiopia, despite being landlocked, possesses something the coastal states do not possess to the same degree:
large-scale military and demographic weight.
The United States therefore has an obvious interest in building relationships with capable regional states.
But the Houthi threat also creates the possibility of a strategic paradox.
The more important the Bab el-Mandeb becomes to Washington, the more strategically valuable the surrounding African coastline becomes—and the greater the significance of Ethiopia’s desire to reach it.

A New Strategic Equation
The pieces are beginning to align.
Ethiopia wants reliable access to the sea.
Eritrea controls Assab and Massawa.
Egypt wants to protect the Nile, Suez and the Red Sea balance.
Somalia remains a major American security partner.
Somaliland occupies the Gulf of Aden and controls access to Berbera.
Djibouti remains a critical maritime and military hub.
The Houthis have demonstrated the vulnerability of the Bab el-Mandeb.
And the United States has a direct interest in keeping this maritime gateway open.
None of these interests automatically leads to conflict.
But together they are producing a much more complicated strategic environment.

The Real Question
The central question is therefore not simply whether the United States is “arming Ethiopia.”
That is too narrow.
The real question is:
What kind of regional security architecture is Washington helping to build around the Bab el-Mandeb—and what role will Ethiopia play in it?
If Ethiopia becomes a stronger American security partner while continuing to demand Red Sea access, the strategic consequences could be profound.
If Ethiopia obtains negotiated access, the region may adjust.
If it establishes a military presence on the Red Sea, Egypt and Eritrea are likely to respond.
And if Ethiopia ever attempts to obtain Assab by force, the consequences could extend far beyond Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The crisis could draw in Egypt, reshape Somalia’s security environment, affect Somaliland and Berbera, and force the United States to choose between competing strategic priorities.

The Assab Question
The Horn of Africa is therefore approaching a crossroads.
The Houthi attacks have exposed the vulnerability of the Bab el-Mandeb.
Washington has a growing interest in the security architecture surrounding it.
Ethiopia wants the sea.
Eritrea wants to preserve sovereignty over its Red Sea coastline.
Egypt wants to prevent a new strategic imbalance on its southern maritime flank.
Somalia remains central to America’s security engagement in the Horn.
Somaliland and Berbera occupy a crucial position on the Gulf of Aden.
The question is how these interests will interact.
There is no evidence today that Washington is preparing Ethiopia to capture Assab.
But there is enough evidence to ask whether a stronger U.S.–Ethiopian strategic relationship could eventually alter the balance around the Red Sea.
And that brings us back to Assab.
Who controls Assab may not determine who controls the Bab el-Mandeb. But whoever shapes the strategic environment around Assab will have a significant influence over one of the world’s most important maritime gateways.
The next chapter of Horn geopolitics may therefore be written not in Addis Ababa, Asmara, Cairo or Mogadishu alone—but across the narrow waters of the Bab el-Mandeb.

1. By Abdillahi Jama Ali – Qurus .A former teacher, trainer, radio journalist, manager, Member of Parliament and Minister, He is now a writer, contributor  and political analyst, drawing on more than 50 years of professional, public-service and political experience. Abdullahi Jama Ali is also a contributor to Araweelo News Network / Associated Online Agencies, where he has published numerous articles and political analyses. His work focuses particularly on current affairs, governance, policy developments, and geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa, offering readers well-crafted perspectives shaped by decades of professional, public-service, and political experience.