The Awdal region in Somaliland should prepare for war against its own government. As he called for the populace to “drop pens and take guns,”

The international community, encompassing organisations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and the United States of America (USA), has invested considerable diplomatic and financial efforts to rebuild the region formerly known as Italian Somalia since the outbreak of civil conflict in 1992. This sustained engagement culminated in establishing the Federal Government of Somalia, which sought to govern the territory once under Italian colonial rule. However, this governmental framework remains fragile and has struggled to maintain stability amid ongoing political and social challenges.

In contrast, Somaliland, a territory once a British protectorate, has successfully built a peaceful and democratic state independently and without any external intervention. Over the past 34 years, the people of Somaliland have organized themselves effectively, establishing a governance system that includes democratic processes. They have successfully elected five presidents through a legitimate one-person, one-vote electoral system, illustrating their commitment to statehood and an independent nation.

Recent global assessments indicate that the prospect of Somalia establishing a stable and functional government remains exceedingly bleak over the next fifty years. Amidst this protracted crisis, a growing number of voices advocate for the formal recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as an independent nation. To overlook the tireless efforts and notable achievements of Somaliland would be to undermine the very ideals of self-governance and democracy that the international community, particularly Western nations, profess to uphold. By disregarding Somaliland’s claim to recognition, which is increasingly supported by its status as a de jure state, one risks neglecting the principles of justice and equity that should guide our response to such enduring struggles for self-determination.

There are significant geopolitical ramifications to consider. The potential reunification of Somalia and Somaliland could lead to heightened tensions, particularly for neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia, where Somali communities exist and are linked by cultural and historical ties. This concept of a greater Somalia also encompasses Djibouti, reflecting a broader regional aspiration among Southern Somali people. While driven by a desire for unity and cultural kinship, this vision has complex implications that could challenge regional stability, and neighbouring states will face endless conflict.

The situation in Somalia is fraught with considerable challenges that affect its citizens, business leaders, and government officials alike. A pervasive reluctance to establish a functional governance system has become evident, undermining efforts to create a stable and cohesive state. Alarming reports have surfaced indicating that several ministers possess affiliations with the militant group Al-Shabaab, which raises serious questions about their commitment to the nation’s stability and security.

A particularly concerning development occurred when the Minister of Defence, who previously served as the Foreign Minister, made a provocative statement urging the residents of the Awdal region in Somaliland to prepare for conflict against their own government. He called for the populace to “drop pens and take up the gun,” raising significant questions about the true intentions of Somalia’s leadership, which some perceive as akin to that of warlords. In fact, just last year, Mr. Fiqi, the current Defence Minister of Villa-Somalia, stated that he would send AL-Shabaab-oriented Islamic fighters to Ethiopia if the Somaliland government granted access to a port and a naval base. Mr. Fiqi’s actions and statements further underscore this sentiment; just last year, he asserted that he would consider deploying Islamic fighters affiliated with Al-Shabaab to Ethiopia if the Somaliland government agreed to grant access to a critical port and establish a naval base. Such remarks not only highlight the growing tensions within the region but also signal the increasingly militaristic and destabilising approach of the current Somali leadership, which jeopardises peace and security in both Somaliland and the broader Horn of Africa.

Summary of Somalia’s History from 1992 to 2025

1992–1995: International Intervention and Humanitarian Crisis

1992: Following the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991, Somalia plunged into civil war. Clashes among clan warlords led to famine and a humanitarian disaster.

UNOSOM I was launched by the United Nations to provide humanitarian aid.

1993: The U.S.-led UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope) intervened to secure aid delivery.

October 1993: Battle of Mogadishu (Black Hawk Down incident) resulted in U.S. casualties and a shift in U.S. policy.

1995: UN peacekeepers withdrew after failing to restore order.

1996–2000: Rise of Warlords and Transitional Peace Efforts

Somalia fragmented into fiefdoms controlled by rival warlords.

No effective central government.

1998: Puntland declared itself an autonomous state.

2000: The Transitional National Government (TNG) was formed in Djibouti under Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, but it lacked authority inside Somalia.

2004–2006: Transitional Federal Government (TFG) & Islamic Courts

2004: Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in Kenya; Abdullahi Yusuf elected president.

The TFG was weak and operated from Baidoa.

2006: The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) took control of Mogadishu and large parts of southern Somalia, establishing relative peace.

Ethiopia, backed by the U.S., invaded Somalia in late 2006 to oust the ICU, reinstalling the TFG in Mogadishu.

2007–2011: Insurgency and Rise of al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab, a radical offshoot of the ICU, launched a violent insurgency.

2007: The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) deployed to support the TFG.

Al-Shabaab took control of much of south-central Somalia.

Constant bombings, assassinations, and attacks plagued Mogadishu.

2012–2016: Federal Government Formation and Gains Against al-Shabaab

2012: A new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was formed; Hassan Sheikh Mohamud became president.

AMISOM and Somali forces pushed al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other key cities.

Provisional Constitution adopted, recognizing federalism and forming new member states (e.g., Jubaland, Southwest, Galmudug).

2017–2021: More Federalization, Political Tensions, and al-Shabaab Threat

2017: Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo elected president.

Tensions increased between the federal government and regional states.

Al-Shabaab remained a serious threat; Mogadishu saw frequent bombings.

Disputes over elections and constitutional reform grew.

2021–2022: Election Crisis and Delays

Farmaajo’s term ended in 2021 without elections, leading to a political standoff and clashes in Mogadishu.

After months of tension, indirect elections were eventually held.

2022–2025: New Government and Ethiopia-Somaliland Rift

2022: Hassan Sheikh Mohamud re-elected as president.

Focus on reconciliation, international diplomacy, and constitutional reform.

2023–2024: Rising tensions over the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia, which proposed Ethiopian access to the Red Sea via Somaliland. Somalia strongly opposed it.

2024–2025: Turkey hosted talks between Ethiopia and Somalia. Somalia aims to block any Ethiopian access without its consent, viewing Somaliland as part of its territory.

Al-Shabaab still controls rural areas, though federal and international efforts continue against them.

In conclusion, the proposal suggests that Somalia be strategically divided into three distinct regions for more effective governance and stability.

Firstly, the Jubaland state could be overseen by the Kenyan government, leveraging Kenya’s geographical proximity and historical ties to facilitate development and security in the region. The objective would be to enhance local governance, economic growth, and counter any extremist threats.

Secondly, the South and West states should fall under Ethiopia’s protective oversight. Given Ethiopia’s experience and interest in ensuring regional stability, it could assist in promoting peace and collaboration among various clans and communities. This arrangement would aim to address long-standing conflicts and promote socio-economic development.

Lastly, the Puntland state, characterised by its greater stability and functioning infrastructure, would benefit from the protection of the United Arab Emirates. With the UAE’s investment capabilities and expertise, this region could significantly improve commerce, job creation, and public services.

For the central regions of Somalia and Banader, it may be advisable to deprioritise immediate intervention and focus instead on grassroots initiatives that empower local communities. This could eventually lead to a self-sustaining recovery and governance model. This reallocation of attention aims to strategically enhance Somalia’s overall stability while addressing the complexities of its diverse regions.

ENG.ABDI ALI BARKHAD

Independent Political Analyst

Hargeisa Somaliland                                                 tra50526@gmail.com 3/5/2025

Engineer Abdi Ali Barkhad is a consulting Somali electrical engineer, political analyst, and writer known for his comprehensive commentary on the politics of the Horn of Africa and international relations. He has published numerous articles analysing current policies in the region and is a staunch advocate for the cause of the Republic of Somaliland. His insights have been featured on platforms such as Araweelo News Network, among others.