Commencing a Yearly Interim National Defense Strategy
Washington (ANN)- According to a Document issued after signing the NDAA, Biden said the act “provides important benefits and enhances access to justice for military personnel and their families, and includes key authorities to support them.” national defense, foreign affairs, and homeland security.”The Senate voted last month to pass the massive NDAA with bipartisan support. It follows the House’s bipartisan approval of the legislation the week prior.
US Partnership document pages 254 and 308 read the recognition of Somali governments in 2012 in US politics, read chapter 9, you will gain an understanding of government and Somaliland which is of interest. Tarry readiness in fiscal year 2022.
At a minimum, the report should include the following information: (1) number of times the range temporarily suspended operations due to migrants being on or near the range; (2) the type and quantity of training that was canceled due to mi-grants causing the range to temporarily suspend operations; (3) whether any of these temporary stoppages to training pre- vented the training objectives from being met;(4) the additional costs of any stoppages to training and schedule adjustments to reschedule any disrupted training; (5) Whether a direct correlation between suspended range oper-ations due to migrant activity and impacts on military readiness
can be made; and (6) what control measures are currently in place to prevent mi- grants from crossing the United States and Mexico border at the range and whether there are plans to modify current control meas-ures.
US Briefing on Over-the-Horizon Operations in Somalia
The committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than January 15, 2023, on the use of over-the-horizon capabilities in Somalia.
The briefing shall include: (1) lessons learned from over-the-horizon operations in Somalia that can be applied to future operations; (2) an evaluation of the security environment in Somalia before and after the United States withdrew permanent forces from the country in January 2021; and (3) a detailed cost analysis of conducting over-the-horizon oper-ations in Somalia as compared to persistent presence operations.
Classified Partnership Support Facilities
The committee understands that partnerships with small busi-nesses and universities are essential to the Department of Defense technology base. However, while small businesses and university research centers routinely have personnel that are cleared to per-form classified work, they often lack access to sensitive compart- mented information facilities (SCIF).
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to pro-vide a report to the Congressional Defense Committees no later than October 1, 2022, on actions being taken by the Department of Defense explore the benefits of a shared use classified facility with ‘‘turn-key’’ services including physical, personnel, and IT secu-rity that would enable small businesses and university research teams to collaborate with DoD researchers on classified projects without having to procure their own dedicated SCIF space.
Commencing a Yearly Interim National Defense Strategy
The committee believes that the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is critical for guiding the President’s Budget to advance and safeguard the national security priorities and democratic values ofthe United States and its allies and partners.
Without access to the NDS prior to the finalization of the annual President’s Budget re-quest, the demands of the current warfighting environment risk.
308(1) the scope and scale of combined military exercises and train-ing on and around the Korean Peninsula considering the evolving threat in the region; (2) efforts to enhance security measures and identify new or ad-
ditional steps to reinforce deterrence in the face of destabilizing ac-tivities by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and (3) efforts to counter threats to the security of the Republic of Korea by Russia and the People’s Republic of China.
Security Partnership with Somaliland The committee notes that increased United States engagement in
the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region has presented an oppor- tunity to strengthen security cooperation and partnership with Somaliland.
The committee notes that while the United States does not recog-nize Somaliland as an independent state, Somaliland occupies a pivotal geographic location in the Horn of Africa and is adjacent to strategic maritime routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and Somaliland has shared interests and assets that could contribute to U.S. military objectives and provide flexibility given the evolvingsecurity situation in the region.
Due to these shared interests, a 50-person U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) survey team visited Somaliland in August 2021 to inspect the Port of Berbera, its adjacent airport, and related infrastructure, observe maritime security operations, and consult with relevant authorities. Subse-quently, a visit to the United States by senior Somaliland officials and a visit to Somaliland by Commander, USAFRICOM, deepened mutual interest for cooperating to secure shared interests.
Given such engagement, changes to U.S. defense posture in the region, and U.S. interests in preserving and expanding stability with the help of democratic partners, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to the House Committee on Armed Services by May 31, 2023, with recommendations for expanding the
security partnership with Somaliland and its potential contribu-tions to U.S. military objectives in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region.
This report should examine a range of areas for possible co-operation, including port access, military training, joint exercises, and intelligence sharing that can promote regional stability, en-hance maritime and border security, and assist in deterring the trafficking of humans, wildlife, weapons, and illicit goods.
State Partnership Program Bilateral Affairs Officers The committee recognizes the State Partnership Program plays an important role in supporting the security cooperation objectives of the United States and the geographic combatant commands by developing enduring relationships with partner countries and carrying out activities to build partner capacity, improve interoper-ability, and enhance U.S. access and influence. Persistent engagements are crucial to developing a tailored approach to improve the readiness of U.S. and partner forces to meet emerging challenges.
Bilateral affairs officers from the National Guard, assigned to the U.S. Embassy located in the State’s partnership country play a crucial role in achieving the objectives of the State Partnership Program.
The committee supports and encourages each State with an active State Partnership Program to assign a bilateral affairs officer to the relevant U.S. Embassy to coordinate State partnership activities, execute partnership support plans, and build enduring relationships between the United States and its partner country.
Strategic Competitor Wargames and Tabletop Exercises
The committee notes that wargaming and tabletop exercises are essential tools for military commanders across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.
Such exercises also help leaders and policymakers better understand the range of possible warfighting futures, innovate and express new ideas, challenge current assumptions, and integrate technologies and capabilities into operations and force structure.
The committee supports the use of recurring wargaming and tabletop exercises across the U.S. Gov-ernment to test the military, diplomatic, and economic response, as well as the domestic resiliency, of the United States in the event of conflict involving a strategic competitor. Such exercises that in-clude Members of Congress and involve all relevant senior leaders from across the interagency, as well as, if appropriate, the private sector and international partners, would help ensure that policy-makers have a comprehensive view of the administration’s ap- proach to potential conflict across all areas of national power against strategic competitors, particularly the People’s Republic of China.
The committee encourages the Department of Defense to maximize interagency participation in such exercises in order to ex-amine how all levers of national power could be used in such sce- narios to achieve unity of effort across the U.S. Government.Further, the committee supports the Department’s use of wargames and tabletop exercises to inform planning in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of operations, specifically with respect to a scenario involving a conflict with China related to Taiwan.
Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to pro-vide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than March 15, 2023, on wargames and tabletop exercises conducted related to Taiwan, or with respect to other scenarios in-volving strategic competition with China in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of operations. Such briefing shall include the pa-rameters of the wargames or exercises, conclusions, and how the conclusions informed the Department’s force posture and resourcing and logistics planning at the strategic and operational levels relative to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command area of operations.
Such briefing shall also include the feasibility and advisability of including interagency partners in such exercises in order to develop an integrated, whole-of-government approach to preserving Taiwan’s security.
Taiwan Air and Missile Defense Capabilities
The committee supports Taiwan’s acquisition of defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-de-fense capability as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), with an emphasis on capabilities that support the asymmetric defense strategy of Taiwan, including, among others, air defense capabilities. Therefore, the committee directs the Sec-retary of Defense to provide a briefing to the House Committee on
310 Armed Services not later than March 1, 2023, on Taiwan’s air and missile defense capabilities. Such briefing shall include:(1) Taiwan’s assessed defensive capability and capacity against the People’s Liberation Army’s air and missile threats; (2) the status of efforts to improve Taiwan’s air defense capabili-ties; (3) the status of the interoperability between U.S. and Taiwan air defense systems; and (4) recommendations on how best to support Taiwan’s expedi-tious acquisition of air defense capabilities.
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By Arraale M Jama Freelance Journalist and Human Rights activist.